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Abstract
Is there any such thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing of innovative projects?
We study a principal–agent model in which the principal chooses the scale of the experiment,
and the agent privately observes the outcome realizations and can privately choose the novelty of
the project. When the agent has private access to a safe but non-innovative project, the principal
starves the agent of funds to incentivize risk-taking. The principal quickly scales up after early
successes, and can tolerate early failures. If the principal is equally informed about the outcome,
then the agent is well-resourced, resembling a large research and development department.
Keywords: Arm’s length versus relationship-based financing; cash-flow diversion; exploration
versus exploitation; financing constraints; firm dynamics
JEL classification: D82; D86; D92; O31
I. Introduction
Is there any such thing as too much capital when it comes to the financing
of innovative projects? Why do small start-ups make most breakthroughs,
even though giant enterprises supply most research and development (R&D)
spending (Baumol, 2010)? Anecdotal evidence suggests that more financial
resources do not necessarily lead to more and better innovation. It is
surprising how many projects fail, despite pursuing ideas that are eventually
successful, with well-resourced and competent teams. Nokia, for example,
had always been an adaptive company and hardly a technological laggard:
its engineers built a prototype of an internet-enabled phone with a touch-
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Moore, József Sákovics, Carl Singleton, Andy Snell, Tim Worrall, and participants at 2018 RES,
2017 EWMES, 2017 SIE, 2016 ASSET, 2015 ALdE, and 2015 SIRE. This work was supported
by the Economic and Social Research Council (grant number ES/J500136/1).
†Current affiliation: European University Institute, 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole, Italy
(alessandro.spiganti@eui.eu).
C© 2018 The Author. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Föreningen
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screen at the end of the 1990s.1 Nokia spent in R&D almost four times
what Apple spent,2 but saw its market share fall from 40 percent in 2007
to 11 percent in 2014. Similarly, because of hefty investment in research,
Kodak developed one of the first digital cameras in 1975, and launched a
photo-sharing web site in 2001.3 However, in January 2012, the company
filed for bankruptcy. Conversely, many successful innovative firms have
started small, with limited resources, but enjoyed high growth rates after
a few years. Airbnb, Dropbox, and Reddit are among the 1,000 start-
ups funded by Y Combinator, an American seed accelerator: Sam Altman,
the president, considers frugality “incredibly important for start-ups”4 and
Jessica Livingston, a co-founder, underlines that “you don’t want to give
the founders more than they need to survive”.5 Fred Wilson, a venture
capitalist with early investments in Twitter and Tumblr, writes on his blog
that “less money raised leads to more success”.6 According to Mr Altman,
this is due to the “focusing effect of limited resources” (emphasis added;
see the article cited in footnote 4), and Ms Livingston adds that “being lean
forces you to focus” (emphasis added; see the article cited in footnote 5).
In this paper, we are interested in understanding the mechanisms through
which frugality can help the innovation process. When does an innovative
project benefit from a lack of resources?
We offer a two-period principal–agent model of innovation investments,
in which a representative investor can use the scale of an experiment to
incentivize an entrepreneur, with limited liability, to be more innovative,
and to learn the business potential of a new project. To study how to
incentivize the agent to focus on innovation, while emphasizing that the
principal might lack technical competence, we assume that the agent can
privately choose between exploring a new technology that involves a small
1See the article by James Surowiecki published in The New Yorker on 3 September 2013,
“Where Nokia went wrong” (available online at http://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/
where-nokia-went-wrong).
2See the article by Anton Troianovski and Sven Grundberg published in The Wall Street Journal
on 18 July 2012, “Nokia’s bad call on smartphones” (available online at http://www.wsj.com/
articles/SB10001424052702304388004577531002591315494).
3See the article “The last Kodak moment?” published by The Economist on 14 January 2012
(available online at http://www.economist.com/node/21542796).
4See the article by Eugen Kim published in Business Insider UK on 24 March 2015, “A warning
to startups from the head of Silicon Valley’s most important startup factory” (available online at
http://uk.businessinsider.com/sam-altman-raising-too-much-money-early-is-bad-2015-3).
5See the article by Tad Friend published in The New Yorker on 10 October 2016, “Sam
Altman’s manifest destiny. Is the head of Y Combinator fixing the world, or trying to take
over Silicon Valley?” (available online at http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/
sam-altmans-manifest-destiny).
6See Fred Wilson’s blog post of 18 September 2013, “Maximizing runway can minimize success”
(available online at http://avc.com/2013/09/maximizing-runway-can-minimize-success/).
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chance of a breakthrough and a high risk of failure, and exploiting an
old technology with a predictable outcome. To study the trade-off between
increasing the scale of the project to reap higher profits, and starving the
agent for incentive reasons, we assume that expected revenues increase
in the amount of capital invested. Finally, because entrepreneurs usually
have a better idea than investors of whether a new technology works,
or whether a new product answers the customers’ needs, we assume that
the outcome realizations are not directly observable by the principal. We
focus on three cases: (i) the full-information case, where the informed
principal observes both the outcome and the technology used by the agent;
(ii) the relationship-based financing case, where the hands-on principal has
the technical competence to distinguish between different technologies but
cannot observe the outcome realizations; (iii) the arm’s length financing
case, where the hands-off principal can observe neither the type of
technology nor the outcome realizations.
We find that innovation is best incentivized by starvation contracts (i.e.,
contracts that entail a small scale initially but potentially high growth later
on) when the agent is better informed than the principal about outcome
realizations, and, at the same time, the agent has private access to a safe
but non-innovative project. Indeed, providing the agent with less capital (a)
minimizes the agent’s incentives to embezzle revenues, and (b) incentivizes
risk-taking. A hands-on investor only worries about motive (a): no matter
the technology used, truthful reporting on the outcome realizations is
incentivized by using a combination of financing constraints, punishments
for failure, and rewards for success. Only a hands-off investor financing
an innovative agent needs to consider motive (b) as well: because the
predictable old technology is initially more likely to succeed, starving an
innovative agent makes a deviation to the conventional work method less
appealing.
We also find that starvation contracts can be welfare improving. As
a measure of social welfare, we consider the total expected payoff of the
match between the investor and the entrepreneur. By comparing the optimal
innovation contract under arm’s length and relationship-based financing,
the following differences can be seen. On the one hand, an innovative
entrepreneur faces initially stronger credit constraints under arm’s length
financing than under relationship-based financing, and this decreases social
welfare. On the other hand, to prevent the agent from resorting to the
safer project, the hands-off principal needs to tolerate early failures and
reward long-term successes, as new technologies are more volatile and
might take longer to become successful. As a consequence, entrepreneurs
engaging in riskier projects retain access to capital even after a failure in
the first period, whereas they would have been terminated under a hands-
on principal; additionally, successful innovative ventures are significantly
C© 2018 The Author. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Föreningen
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scaled up at the beginning of the second period. Both of these effects
increase social surplus. We show that there exists a parameter space for
which the positive effects are greater than the negative effect. Therefore,
expected welfare can increase in the degree of informational asymmetry
between entrepreneurs and financiers.
We derive some implications of our model for firm dynamics. The
relationship between a firm’s innovative activities and its growth rate is not
straightforward in the empirical literature. Our model suggests that such
a relationship is influenced by the type of financing the firm has access
to, or equivalently by the degree of informational asymmetry between the
principal and the agent, and by the riskiness of the project. In particular, we
find that innovative firms start smaller and grow faster than conventional
firms only under arm’s length financing, and more significantly so for riskier
projects. As far as we know, this finding has not been tested empirically
yet.
Our results show that the best way to incentivize innovation varies across
different economic environments. When the principal is equally (or better)
informed about the outcome of the experiment, the agent is well resourced,
resembling a large R&D department. Conversely, lean, fast-growing start-
ups are optimal when the researchers can spend their time on safe but
non-innovative alternatives and when they have a better idea than investors
about whether a new technology answers the customers’ needs. Thus, our
model suggests a possible explanation for why Nokia failed to develop
a modern mobile OS and subsequently lost the smartphone battle with
Apple. “At Apple the top managers are engineers, [whereas] there was
no real software competence in the top management team [at Nokia]”.7
Analogously for the demise of Kodak, there was a separation between
research, finance, and business functions, each reporting up through their
own hierarchies: the research ranks at Kodak “used to be a closed society,
where some researchers kept their records in locked safes”, and “researchers
. . . never used to see [the business units] at all”.8 Both the “lack of
technical competence among top managers [at Nokia]” (emphasis added;
see the article cited in footnote 7), and the separation between researchers
and business managers at Kodak meant that managers could not evaluate
whether the projects being pursued were really aimed at long-term success,
and thus hefty investments failed to give proper incentives to the research
7See the article by Quy Huy and Tim Vuori published by INSEAD Knowledge on 22
September 2015, “Who Killed Nokia? Nokia Did” (available online at https://knowledge.insead.
edu/strategy/who-killed-nokia-nokia-did-4268).
8See the article by Claudia H. Deutsch published in The New York Times on 2008, “At Kodak,
some old things are new again” (available online at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/02/
technology/02kodak.html).
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teams.9 Perhaps scarcer resources, coupled with this hands-off management,
or a large budget under the supervision of tech-savvy managers, would have
worked better. Conversely, Apple rightly chose to develop the iPhone and
iOS in-house, pairing a large budget for its R&D department with the
technical competencies of its managers, but, for example, decided to buy
an intelligent personal assistant software from the start-up Siri Incorporated.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section II puts
our model in the context of the relevant theoretical literature, and our
theoretical predictions in the context of the empirical literature. Section III
outlines the technical details of the model, and provides the full-information
case. Section IV derives optimal arrangements under the relationship-based
financing case. Section V derives the optimal contracts offered by a hands-
off principal. Section VI uses numerical simulations to derive implications
for firm dynamics and social welfare. Finally, Section VII concludes.
II. Related Literature
In this section, we first discuss how our model fits in the related theoretical
literature on innovation investments, then we describe how our theoretical
results find support in the empirical literature.
Many recent theoretical papers have studied the incentives for
experimentation using repeated principal–agent models. In Bergemann and
Hege (1998, 2005), Hörner and Samuelson (2013), and Halac et al. (2016),
both sides learn about the unknown quality of the project, but the agent
can distort the principal’s perception of profitability by shirking or privately
reducing the amount invested.10,11 In these papers, parties wait for the
9However, our model does not explain why agents were given the wrong incentives in the first
place.
10Bergemann and Hege (2005) also compare the provision of funds under arm’s length
(unobservable investments) and relationship-based financing (observable investments), and find
that the funding volume is always higher under the former. In their model though, the benefit
from increased informational asymmetry comes from the lack of commitment: when investment
is unobservable, the principal becomes more pessimistic after a deviation and is thus able to
commit to a finite stopping time, reducing the agent’s ability to renegotiate at favourable terms and
thus her incentives to delay investments into the project through deviations. Similar mechanisms
appear in Crémer (1995) and Hörner and Samuelson (2013).
11In Halac et al. (2016), the principal–agent model involves both adverse selection on agent’s
ability and dynamic moral hazard. Related are also the experimentation frameworks of Drugov
and Macchiavello (2014), with both adverse selection and moral hazard, Bouvard (2014), who
only consider adverse selection on the quality of the agent, Gomes et al. (2016), who introduce
two-dimensional adverse selection, and Bobtcheff and Levy (2017), where the agent has private
information on the quality of learning. Outside of a pure experimentation framework, see also
Gerardi and Maestri (2012), who study dynamic incentives for information acquisition under
C© 2018 The Author. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Föreningen
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arrival of a single success, and the agent has only one work method to
produce it; moreover, the moral hazard is on the agent’s actions (effort or
investment). Conversely, in our model, a success is valuable but does not
end the relationship and can be produced through different methods; also,
we focus on moral hazard on the method pursued.12 As a result, the terms
of our optimal contracts vary depending on the method being incentivized.
More generally, private information on the method pursued allows us
to focus on the tension between exploration and exploitation, similarly to
Manso (2011).13 In his two-period model, which is the closest to ours, the
agent, uncertain about the true distribution of payoffs from the available
actions, can choose between either shirking, using a new untested action,
or a well-known process. An agency problem arises because the three
actions are associated with different private levels of effort. The optimal
contract can reward early failures, and compensation depends not only on
total performance but also on its path.
Whereas the model of Manso (2011) and related models apply better to
mature firms, our focus is on understanding which contracts are better suited
to small independent start-ups. The main differences are that start-ups are
characterized by minimal resources and hands-off management by investors.
In Manso (2011), the size of the project is exogenously assumed away, and
agents might be uninformed about their performance. In contrast, in our
model, the scale of the project is endogenously chosen by the principal,
and the termination decision is made partly based on information that the
agent provides to the investors.14 As a consequence, Manso-style contracts
(i.e., well-resourced firms) are optimal when the principal and the agent
both moral hazard and adverse selection, and DeMarzo and Sannikov (2017), who study private
learning under moral hazard. None of these papers considers moral hazard on the choice between
exploration and exploitation, which is one of the main ingredients of our model.
12In Section V, we consider a dynamic two-dimensional moral hazard problem as the agent has
private information on both the outcomes and the method pursued.The cash-flow diversion model
we employ follows from Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006),
but, more generally, our paper is also related to the fast-growing dynamic financial contracting
literature, that uses the optimal contract framework to analyze and characterize theoretically the
contractual relationship between firms and investors under a variety of agency problems. The
main characteristic that we share with (most of) this literature is the fact that limited liability
protects the agent, and thus inefficient downsizing and termination arise for incentive reasons.
13Ederer (2016) extends this framework to a multi-agent setting and Klein (2016) studies a
related model in continuous-time.
14Drugov and Macchiavello (2014) consider the case where the firm can “start small”, without this
affecting the informativeness of the experimentation. Because the amount invested is smaller, this
can be useful to avoid the embezzlement of funds, similarly to our Section IV. However, the size
of the experiment is exogenous in their framework. Moreover, their agent has only one method
to produce a success, whereas two methods are available in our model. As a consequence, in our
model, the principal reduces (increases) the scale of the project to elicit the riskier (safer) option.
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are equally informed about the outcome realizations, but resource-starved
start-ups are optimal when the agent is better informed.
Many of our theoretical results find support in the empirical literature.
First, evidence that the combination of tolerance for early failure and reward
for long-term success is effective in motivating innovation is provided by
Azoulay et al. (2011) and Tian and Wang (2014), using naturally occurring
data, and Ederer and Manso (2013), by exogenously varying compensation
schemes in an experimental setting. In the theoretical literature, similar
results are reached by Holmström (1989) and Manso (2011).15 Secondly,
Atanassov (2016) finds that firms with a greater proportion of arm’s
length financing have more and better (i.e., more cited) patents, perhaps
because this allows greater flexibility and tolerance to experimentation
than relationship-based bank financing. Thirdly, while there is no general
consensus, many empirical articles support the so-called “less money, better
innovation” argument (Hall et al., 2016); that is, financing constraints can
have a disciplinary effect on innovative investments, by limiting the moral
hazard problem and forcing firms to focus on more productive and value-
enhancing innovation. Almeida et al. (2013) find that firms that are more
likely to be constrained generate more patents and citations per unit of
R&D investment and per employee; in Li (2011), a positive relation between
R&D investment and stock returns exists only among financially constrained
firms. Dryden et al. (1997), Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999), and Musso and
Schiavo (2008) show that financing constraints are positively related with
productivity growth.16 Keupp and Gassmann (2013) provide partial support
for the hypothesis that financial constraints spur radical innovations. Schäfer
et al. (2015) find that family businesses are more likely to be constrained but
have the same level of innovation outcomes as non-family firms, perhaps
due to more efficient resource utilization. Lahr and Mina (2018) find that
15This is consistent with headlines such as “Fail to Succeed” (see the article by Matt Cowan
published in Wired UK on 25 April 2011, available online at http://www.wired.co.uk/magazine/
archive/2011/05/features/fail-to-succeed), “Fail Often, Fail Well” (see the article published by
The Economist on 14April 2011, available online at http://www.economist.com/node/18557776),
and “Google’s Greatest Strength May Be the Luxury of Failure” (see the article by Steve
Rosenbush published in The Wall Street Journal on 17 May 2013, available online at http://blogs.
wsj.com/cio/2013/05/17/googles-greatest-strength-may-be-the-luxury-of-failure/). Indeed, the
tolerance of failure has become a dominant theme in Silicon Valley, where, for example, FailCon,
a conference about embracing failure, was launched in 2009. Whilst this has been an annual event
for several years, it was recently cancelled because “failure chatter is now so pervasive in Silicon
Valley that a conference almost seems superfluous” (see the article “Wearing your failures on
your sleeve” by Claire Martin published in The NewYork Times in 2014, available online at http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/09/business/wearing-your-failures-on-your-sleeve.html? r=0).
16In the theoretical literature, a similar argument is advanced by Jensen (1986) and Aghion et al.
(1999).
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while innovation activities seem to cause financial constraint, the reverse
effect appears negligible.
Finally, we find that the relationship between innovation investments
and firm growth depends on the type of financing the firm has access
to, or, equivalently, on the degree of informational asymmetry between
the financiers and the entrepreneur. As far as we know, this theoretical
prediction has not been tested empirically. The applied literature suggests
that the relationship between innovation and firm growth is usually positive
but not straightforward (Coad, 2009). For example, Coad and Rao (2008)
note that the relationship between innovative activities and firm growth
is positive among the fastest growing firms, but it can be negative for
others; Demirel and Mazzucato (2012) find that R&D boosts growth only
for a subset of small pharmaceutical firms; Segarra and Teruel (2014) and
Mazzucato and Parris (2015) argue that the effect of R&D on firm growth
differs between industries and competitive environments.
III. The Model
An entrepreneur (the agent) has the ability to operate risky projects but
has no wealth of her own. A representative investor (the principal) has the
necessary deep pockets but lacks the entrepreneurial ability. Together they
form a firm to run the projects. Both the entrepreneur and the investor
are risk neutral and discount future cash flows using the same discount
factor, normalized to 1. Both are able to commit to a long-term contract,
in the sense that if they both sign the contract, they abide by it in every
circumstance. We assume that the entrepreneur has limited liability and a
reservation payoff equal to zero, so that she will never voluntarily quit.
There are two periods and two possible outcomes in each period. At
the beginning of each period, the principal provides a certain amount of
working capital.17 The collaboration terminates at the end of the second
period. Once the firm is formed, the agent can decide whether to rely on
a well-known project C (for conventional) or to explore a new technology
N (for novel or new) whose probability of success is unknown.18 Both
methods yield revenues that are subject to shocks and that increase with
the amount of working capital invested. In particular, the well-known project
is successful with probability πC and fails with the remaining probability
1 − πC , yielding zero revenues. If successful, the outcome of the project
17The results do not qualitatively change if, additionally, a fixed initial investment is needed (e.g.,
to acquire an enabling asset).
18In Online Appendix B, we introduce a private cost incurred by the agent when employing the
novel approach. This complicates the analysis but does not qualitatively change the conclusions.
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is positive and is given by R(kt ) = Akαt , where A > 0, α ∈ (0, 1), and kt
represents the amount of working capital invested in the project in period
t (its scale).19
Similarly, the new work method yields either R(kt ) or 0. However,
following Manso (2011), we assume that the novel work method has an
exploratory nature: its probability of success πN is unknown. Moreover,
when the agent starts experimenting with this new project, she is less likely
to succeed than when she relies on the well-known project. Nevertheless, if
the experimentation leads to a success, the new method becomes perceived
as better than the conventional work method.20 This is formalized as
follows.
Assumption 1 (Explorative project). E[πN |L, N] < E[πN ] < πC <
E[πN |H, N].
Here, E[πi] and E[πi |s, i] denote, respectively, the unconditional
expectation of πi and the conditional expectation of πi given outcome
s = {H, L} on action i = {C, N}. We indicate success with H (for high
outcome) and failure with L (for low). Moreover, we assume that the
probability of success of the conventional project is known.
Assumption 2 (Conventional project). πC = E[πC] = E[πC |H,C] =
E[πC |L,C].
Note that using project i only gives information on the probability of
success of the same project, πi , that is, E[πi] = E[πi |H, j] = E[πi |L, j] for
j  i.
Following Manso (2011), we define an action plan as 〈i〉 jz , where i is
the first-period action, j is the second-period action in the case of success,
and z is the second-period action in the case of failure. The total expected
payoff of the match between investor and entrepreneur by following action
19Many of our theoretical results are proven for a general function R that is continuous,
differentiable, strictly concave, strictly increasing, and uniformly bounded from above (see Online
Appendix A.2). The parameter values used to produce the figures in the main paper are πC = 0.4
andα = 0.33, and A is chosen such that the first-best scale of the firm when using the conventional
project is kFB = 10,000. The qualitative results do not hinge on this specific parametrization.
Simulations are run using numpy (van der Walt et al., 2011); graphs are drawn in matplotlib
(Hunter, 2007). We used Python 2.7.
20Even if the unconditional probability of success is expected to be lower under the novel project,
exploration might be valuable because it allows entrepreneur and investor to acquire information
about the probability of success in the second period. Obviously, if E[πN ] ≥ πC , then the
conventional project would never be pursued in the first period (but it might be pursued after a
failure on the novel project).
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plan 〈i〉 jz is given by




z + E[πi]{E[πj |H, i]R(kH 〈i〉
j
z) − kH 〈i〉
j
z}
+(1 − E[πi]){E[πz |L, i]R(kL 〈i〉
j





z represents the scale of the project in period 1 under the action
plan 〈i〉 jz , and kH 〈i〉
j
z and kL 〈i〉
j
z are the scales of the project in period 2
contingent on success or failure, respectively. Hereafter, we refer to W 〈i〉 jz




, which are usually defined as “exploitation” and “exploration” in
the bandit problem literature.21 Exploitation refers to the repetition of the
well-known project C, while exploration consists of trying the new project
N in the first period, sticking to it in the case of success, but returning to
the conventional project in the case of failure.
For ease of reading, we relegate the analytical steps and the proofs to
Online Appendix A.2, together with the closed-form solutions.
Benchmark: The Full-Information Case
Before introducing the moral hazard problems, we solve the bandit problem
in isolation. We assume that information is costless and readily available
to a benevolent social planner who wishes to maximize the expected net
amount of output produced. Thus, solving this single agent’s problem will
give us the first-best levels of investment and the efficient choice between
exploration and exploitation.22
At the optimum, the expected marginal benefit of providing one
unit of working capital must be equal to its constant marginal cost.
Under exploitation, the unique solution, kFB 〈C〉C
C
, is pinned down by the
following first-order condition (FOC)
πCR
′(kFB〈C〉CC ) = 1, (2)
21In Online Appendix A.2, we show that any other action plan is dominated by either one of
these.
22The informed social planner’s problem is equivalent to a setting in which there is no information
asymmetry on the cash-flow realization between principal and agent, independent of the investor’s
ability to observe the action plan chosen by the agent (see Online Appendix A.3). In Online
Appendix B.1, we tackle a problem similar to that in Manso (2011), where the project-selection
stage is the private information of the agent, who incurs a private cost, but the outcome of the
project is public information. We confirm the result of Manso (2011) that the agent will not be
compensated for a success in the first period, but might be compensated for an early failure. We
show that in such a setting, the first-best levels of capital are always provided. In general, when
the contract can be made contingent on outcome realizations, there is no need to distort the capital
provision.
C© 2018 The Author. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Föreningen
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where the prime indicates the first derivative. Similarly, under exploration,












C ) = 1. (3c)













Under exploitation, the efficient scale of the project is the same across
periods and outcomes. When it is socially optimal to explore, the lender
provides a lower amount of capital than under exploitation in the first
period because the expected probability of success is lower. If the project
fails, the agent stops experimenting and reverts to the well-known project
in the second period, using the unconstrained efficient amount of capital.
Conversely, after a success, the novel approach becomes perceived as more
likely to succeed than the well-known one, thus it is efficient to provide
more capital.
IV. The Relationship-Based Financing Case
Here, we add one moral hazard problem to the model of the previous
section. The agency problem arises because it is impossible to make the
contract explicitly contingent on realized outcomes, as such outcomes are
private information for the agent.23 However, we assume that the investor
has the technical competence to distinguish between the two technologies:
the principal can observe and verify the work method employed by the
entrepreneur, and thus the type of project is contractible. Because in this
setting the principal acquires significant information about the firm, we refer
to this situation as relationship-based financing, and to such an investor as
hands-on. In Section V, we relax this assumption and compare the optimal
contracts.
23One possible interpretation is that only the entrepreneur can observe the outcome of the project.
Another potential interpretation is that the cash-flow realizations are observable but not verifiable.
However, while in our two-period model the two formulations have identical repercussions, in
a multi-period model the former would lead to asymmetric information about the probability
of success under N , whereas the second interpretation would not. Another formulation of the
problem would be to consider an observable and contractible outcome but a non-verifiable use
of investment. In Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), the two formulations turn out to be identical.
Also, see DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), who construct a model of firm dynamics that is able to
encompass a variety of agency problems.
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At time 0, the investor makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
entrepreneur.24 This offer consists of a contract σ that specifies the capital
advances k = {k1, kH, kL} and the agent’s repayment at the end of period 1
after a reported success, τH .25 These terms can be contingent on all
information provided by the entrepreneur, which consists of a series of
reports on the outcome realizations. As these are privately observed by the
agent, she can under-report them, diverting the excess cash flow for her
own consumption.26 Because limited liability protects the agent,
R(k1〈i〉
j
z) − τH 〈i〉
j
z ≥ 0. (5)
The contracting problem is reminiscent of a truth-telling equilibrium of
a direct mechanism, and indeed the contract must elicit truthful reporting.
The relevant incentive-compatibility constraint is the one imposing truthful
reporting in the good state at the end of the first period:27
−τH 〈i〉
j
z + E[πj |H, i]R(kH 〈i〉
j
z) ≥ E[πz |H, i]R(kL 〈i〉
j
z). (6)
This condition requires the continuation payoff of the entrepreneur when
she reports the outcome realization truthfully to be at least as high as the
payoff from diversion. We also normalize to zero the outside option of the
agent: the participation constraint is implied by the incentive-compatibility
and limited-liability constraints.
24Thus, all bargaining power lies in the hand of the investor. While this might not be too far from
reality for an emerging firm requiring venture capital, it is more likely that neither party has all
the bargaining power. We leave this interesting extension to future research.
25In theory, there are six repayments to consider, two at the end of the first period and four at the
end of the second period, each conditional on a particular history. However, in the second period,
the entrepreneur will always report the outcome associated with the lower cost. This implies that
the second-period repayment must be independent of the second-period realization, but it can
be history-dependent. However, limited liability implies that, conditional on a low report, the
agent pays nothing. It follows that the only non-negative repayment is τH . Note that, similarly
to Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), we are excluding from the analysis the possibility that the
repayments are negative: numerical simulations can be used to confirm that this is without loss
of generality, as positive repayments would be used anyway for incentive reasons.
26While we interpret the diversion as tunneling (or embezzling), other activities could fit the
model, such as the agent receiving non-monetary benefits from projects that benefit her at the
expenses of the principal.
27Because the repayments in period 2 are independent of the outcome in period 2, we can disregard
the incentive-compatibility constraint for period 2. We also note that there is no incentive for the
agent to report the high outcome when the low outcome is actually realized, as the entrepreneur in
that case does not have any fund to make the corresponding transfer to the principal. In Section V,
the actions taken by the agent will not be observable. As a consequence, additional incentive-
compatibility constraints will ensure than neither tunneling nor the alternative action are chosen
by the agent.
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The optimal contract under relationship-based financing maximizes the
expected profits of the investor,




z − E[πi]kH 〈i〉
j
z − (1 − E[πi])kL 〈i〉
j
z, (7)
subject to the limited-liability constraint in equation (5) and the incentive-
compatibility constraint in equation (6). Control variables are the levels of
capital and the repayment in period 1 after a success.28 We use V 〈i〉 jz to
indicate the expected profits of the entrepreneur. The main characteristics
of the optimal exploitation and exploration contracts offered by a hands-on
principal are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Optimal contract under a hands-on principal). The optimal
contract offered by a hands-on principal σ〈i〉 jz is such that (a) the agent
repays the entire outcome at the end of the first period, (b) the firm is terminated
after a failure, (c) the firm is credit constrained in both periods, and (d) the
firm grows after a success.
This proposition shows that the optimal contracts that motivate
exploration and exploitation resemble a standard pay-for-performance
incentive scheme, similarly to the contracts used to motivate an agent in
costly state verification, cash-flow diversion, and repeated effort models.
First, they both require back-loading of the agent’s rewards. The agent just





z) = E[πj |H, i]R(kH 〈i〉
j
z). (8)
Indeed, the optimal contract under unobservable outcomes is such that, after
a success in the first period, the expected payoff in period 2 will act as the
carrot that persuades the agent to part with the first-period return, and in
fact it is exactly equal to this value.
Second, the firm is always terminated following a failure. The possibility
to terminate the project for incentive reasons is well recognized in the
literature, and it is a tool that is used by the principal in both Bolton
and Scharfstein (1990) and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006). Cornelli and
Yosha (2003) emphasize that the option to abandon a project is essential,
as an entrepreneur will most likely never quit a failing project as long
as others are providing the capital. Both the credible threat to abandon a
venture (Sahlman, 1990; Kerr et al., 2014) and ex ante staging (Kaplan
and Strömberg, 2003, 2004) are important components of the relationship
between entrepreneurs and venture capitalists.
28Obviously, the principal will only offer the contract associated with the higher expected profits:
the choice of which action plan to incentivize is also made by the investor.
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Finally, the amount of working capital provided when information is
asymmetric is always lower than the first-best levels, so we define the firm
as being credit constrained in both periods. As in Clementi and Hopenhayn
(2006), credit constraints arise endogenously in response to the moral
hazard problem, and are relaxed following a success.29
The optimal contracts derived in this section might not be incentive
compatible against alternative action plans if the investor can observe
neither the output nor the actions taken by the agent. We investigate this
issue in Section V.
V. The Arm’s Length Financing Case
In this section, we consider the full double moral hazard model: we assume
that the principal can observe neither the outcome realization nor the agent’s
work method. Compared with the model in the previous section, the investor
has less information, so we refer to this case as arm’s length financing, and
to such an investor as hands-off. We show that the contracts derived in
Section IV are usually not incentive compatible when the principal can
observe neither the outcome nor the work method, as additional incentive-
compatibility constraints might be binding. Thus, we derive the optimal
arm’s length exploration and exploitation contracts. Finally, we discuss the
results.
It will prove useful to distinguish between two forms of exploration: we
call exploration “moderate” if the probability of two consecutive successes
is higher under the novel approach than under the conventional work
method, and “radical” otherwise.
Definition 1 (Forms of Exploration). Exploration is moderate if E[πN ]
E[πN |H, N] > πCπC , and radical otherwise.
Optimal Exploration Contract
The optimal exploration contract under the hands-on principal of Section IV
is not incentive compatible if the entrepreneur can rely on the well-known
project without getting caught. Indeed, under the putative hands-on contract,
the agent receives a utility equal to the first-period return in the case
of success, but only with the probability of success in period 1. This
probability of success is higher under C, and she can clearly obtainthe
29This is consistent with the extensive use of control rights in real-world financial contracts
documented by Kaplan and Strömberg (2003).
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same payoff by tunneling the outcome if a success occurs, but with a
higher probability. So, this has to be a profitable deviation.
The maximization problem of a hands-off principal wanting to
implement exploration must thus pay cognisance to the following potential
deviations.30 First, the agent can decide to use the novel approach in




C + E[πN |H, N]R(kH 〈N〉
N
C ) − E[πN |H, N]R(kL 〈N〉
N
C ) ≥ 0. (9)
Secondly, the following constraint ensures that the agent does not want to
deviate by relying on the conventional approach at time 1, with the intention
of tunneling the positive outcome in case of success:31
E[πN ]{R(k1〈N〉
N
C ) − τH 〈N〉
N
C } − πCR(k1〈N〉
N
C )
+E[πN ]E[πN |H, N]R(kH 〈N〉
N
C ) − E[πN ]πCR(kL 〈N〉
N
C ) ≥ 0. (10)
Finally, the investor avoids exploitation by imposing




C ) + πCR(kL 〈N〉
N
C )}
+{E[πN ]E[πN |H, N] − πCπC}R(kH 〈N〉
N
C ) ≥ 0. (11)
The following proposition summarizes the main characteristics of the
optimal exploration contract offered by a hands-off principal.
Proposition 2 (Optimal exploration contract under a hands-off principal).
The optimal exploration contract offered by a hands-off principal σ〈N〉N
C
is
such that (a) the agent repays the entire outcome at the end of the first period,
(b) the firm is terminated after a failure only if exploration is moderate, (c)
the firm grows after a success, and (d) the firm is credit constrained in both
periods. Moreover, (e) the firm can grow after a failure, (f) the firm is bigger
after a success than after a failure, and (g) the hands-off principal provides
less capital in the first period than the hands-on principal.
When actions are unobservable, front-loading the agent’s reward would
incentivize exploitation, as success is initially more likely under the
conventional work method. Moreover, after a success in the first period,
the second-period outcome provides additional information about the first-
period action, as the expected probability of success with the new work
method in the second period depends on the action taken by the agent in
30Other deviations can be disregarded given Assumption 1.
31Note the fact that R being the same for both projects plays a role here. For example, if it was
higher under N than under the deviation C, then the agent might not be able to repay even if
success occurs.
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the first period. To incentivize exploration, it is therefore optimal to delay
compensation to the second period.
Proposition 2(a) allows us to simplify the incentive-compatibility
constraint in equation (11), which ensures that the agent does not want
to exploit, to
{πC − E[πN]}πCR(kL 〈N〉
N
C )+ {E[πN ]E[πN |H, N] − πCπC}R(kH 〈N〉
N
C ) ≥ 0.
(12)
When exploration is moderate, the inequality in equation (12) is satisfied by
any non-negative value of kL 〈N〉NC and kH 〈N〉
N
C
. Given that kL 〈N〉NC enters
with a negative sign in the right-hand side of all other constraints, it is then
optimal to terminate the firm after a failure. Conversely, when exploration
is radical, a positive value of kL 〈N〉NC is needed to satisfy constraint (12),
the one associated with exploiting, but this comes at the cost of making
constraint (9), the one associated with tunneling, stricter. On the one hand,
a larger scale after a failure in the first period makes it more attractive
for the agent to deceptively report a low outcome, thus incentivizing the
diversion of funds. On the other hand, the probability of failure is higher
initially when using the novel method, and thus rewarding an early failure
dissuades the agent from exploiting.
Thus, to prevent the agent from resorting to the safer project, the
hands-off principal rewards the agent for early failure and long-term




form of exploration.32 When exploration is moderate, the principal prefers
to incentivize it through kH 〈N〉NC , because two consecutive successes are
a clear signal of the use of the novel approach. When exploration is




probability of two consecutive successes under the novel approach decreases
(i.e., exploration becomes very radical), failure in the first period becomes
a stronger and stronger signal that the agent explored – even stronger than
two consecutive successes – and thus a bigger kL 〈N〉NC isprovided. However,
32As in Manso (2011), the agent’s reward is contingent on the performance path and not only on
the number of successes. In particular, if we compare total compensation when performance is
LH rather than HL, we see that an agent who recovers from a failure receives a compensation
at least as high as one who obtains a short-lived success. When performance is LH , the agent
receives 0 under moderate exploration (because the firm is terminated) or R(kL ) under radical
exploration. When performance is HL, the agent receives 0 under both moderate and radical
exploration, as the agent repays the entire outcome in the first period, and produces zero in the
second. In Manso (2011), it might be the case that even an agent who fails twice receives a higher
compensation than one who succeeds only in the first period. Here, both receive zero as there is
no outcome in the case of failure.
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it is not optimal to use only kL 〈N〉NC because it incentivizes the agent to
tunnel the funds. In general, the firm is credit constrained in both periods
but the scale of the firm increases following a success. Indeed, a successful
firm is significantly scaled up: this prevents tunneling and also allows the
principal to delay compensation to the second period.
Finally, the hands-off principal provides less capital in the first period
than the hands-on principal: the agent is starved initially. The hands-off
principal prefers to start small, not only to minimize potential losses but
also because starving the agent of funds incentivizes risk-taking: because
the conventional approach is initially more likely to succeed, providing
less capital in the first period minimizes the opportunity cost of employing
the novel method by making a deviation to the conventional work method
less appealing.33
The increased information asymmetry can be socially valuable, as the
fact that the principal must provide additional incentives to the agent can
increase social welfare. As explained above, there are two reasons for which
the total amount of capital can increase in the informational asymmetry, and
both arise because the hands-off principal needs to deter exploitation. First,
the hands-off principal is less likely to inefficiently terminate a project
after early failure, as harsh punishment for early failure discourages risky
ventures. Second, the hands-off principal tends to reward long-term success
more lavishly, through a bigger scale in the second period after a success
in the first period. In the dark area of Figure 1, a larger scale after
success and/or a positive scale after a failure more than compensate for the
initially smaller scale under arm’s length financing. Thus, this represents
the region of the probabilities of success of the novel approach for which











, given the additional informational
asymmetry.34 The presence of additional deviations means that the agent
might require a higher surplus under arm’s length financing, V〈N〉N
C
, than
under relationship-based financing, V〈N〉N
C
, to implement the action plan
chosen by the principal.




an unsuccessful firm grows when exploration is very radical. See Online Appendix A.2 for a
more formal analysis.
34In our model, a principal would always like to have the additional information regarding the
project selection stage, as this information is costless. In reality, the choice between becoming a
hands-on rather than a hands-off principal is probably endogenous (e.g., it might depend on the
willingness of the principal to invest in acquiring the technical competence).
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Fig. 1. Welfare from exploration: observable versus unobservable actions




, 0}. Darker shades are associated with higher
values, meaning that social welfare is higher under unobservability of both outcomes and actions. In the white
area, W 〈N 〉N
C
< W 〈N 〉N
C
. The dashed line represents the zero contour. The dotted line separates moderate
exploration (above) from radical exploration (below).
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2. Exploration surplus: observable versus unobservable actions
Notes: (a) This panel shows negative contours for S 〈N 〉N
C
− S 〈N 〉N
C
, where darker shades are associated
with lower values. (b) This panel shows contours for max{V 〈N 〉N
C
− V 〈N 〉N
C
, 0}, where darker shades are
associated with higher values. In the white area, V 〈N 〉N
C
≤ V 〈N 〉N
C
. The dashed line represents the zero
contour. In both panels, the dotted line separates moderate exploration (above) from radical exploration (below).
Optimal Exploitation Contract
Consider the optimal exploitation contract derived in Section IV: following
a success, the hands-on principal receives the entire outcome in period 1,
and rewards the agent by providing a positive amount of capital to be
invested in period 2; the firm is terminated following a failure in the first
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an agent now can deviate in period 1 by using the novel approach. If she
succeeds at the end of period 1, she can repay the investor with the outcome
of the exploration and run N again in period 2,35 to obtain an expected
payoff of E[πN ]E[πN |H, N]R(kH 〈C〉
C
C
). Clearly, the contract of Section IV
is still incentive compatible when innovation is radical; the additional layer
of information asymmetry does not matter because the agent does not
want to explore anyway. Under moderate exploration, however, the optimal
exploitation contract of Section IV cannot be enforced, as the additional
incentive-compatibility constraints are not satisfied.
Formally, a hands-off principal proposing an exploitation contract needs
to incentivize the agent to avoid three deviations.36 First, the agent must




C + πCR(kH 〈C〉
C
C ) − πCR(kL 〈C〉
C
C ) ≥ 0. (13)
Secondly, the principal needs to incentivize the agent to exploit, rather than
explore:
(πC − E[πN ]){R(k1〈C〉
C
C ) − τH 〈C〉
C
C − πCR(kL 〈C〉
C
C )}
+{πCπC − E[πN ]E[πN |H, N]}R(kH 〈C〉
C
C ) ≥ 0. (14)
Lastly, the following constraint ensures that the agent does not want to use




C ) − τH 〈C〉
C
C } − E[πN ]R(k1〈C〉
C
C ) + πCπCR(kH 〈C〉
C
C )
−{πC(πC − E[πN ]) + E[πN ]E[πN |H, N]}R(kL 〈C〉
C
C ) ≥ 0. (15)
The following proposition summarizes the main characteristic of the
optimal exploitation contract under a hands-off principal.
Proposition 3 (Optimal exploitation contract under a hands-off principal).
When exploration is radical, the optimal exploitation contract does not depend
on the observability of the work method, and thus the same exploitation







. When exploration is moderate, the optimal exploitation




is such that (a) part of
the agent’s compensation is front-loaded to the first period, (b) the firm is
35Note that the agent could, alternatively, tunnel the outcome, foregoing any payoff in period 2.
However, given Assumption 1, this is associated with a lower payoff.
36The agent actually has access to other combinations of the projects, and thus more incentive-
compatibility constraints should be considered. However, given Assumption 1, we can disregard
them from the maximization problem as they will never bind.
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terminated after a failure, (c) the firm might shrink after a success, and (d) the
firm is credit constrained in both periods. Moreover, (e) the hands-off principal
provides less capital in the second period than the hands-on principal.
Below, we focus on the moderate exploration case. Two observations
simplify the maximization problem. First, note that an increase in
R(k1〈C〉CC ) − τH 〈C〉
C
C
relaxes the two constraints associated with
exploration, (14) and (15). As a consequence, the limited-liability constraint
does not bind. Indeed, when the principal wants the agent to exploit, he
must pay the agent an extra premium in case of success in the first period,
as the conventional approach is initially more likely to succeed. Secondly,
kL 〈C〉CC enters with a negative sign in the left-hand side of all constraints, as
rewarding the agent for a first-period failure incentivizes both tunneling and
exploration: threat of termination following a failure is a common feature
of the optimal exploitation contract, independent of the assumptions on the
degree of information asymmetry.
As before, the firm is credit constrained in both periods. However, it
might be the case that it receives more capital from the hands-off investor,
who incentivizes the agent to exploit by providing an extra premium for
early success. This is done by increasing the level of working capital in the
first period. Conversely, reward for late success is always discouraged, as
it incentivizes exploration: the hands-off principal provides less capital in
the case of success than a hands-on principal, but still a positive amount,
which, paired with the threat of termination, is used to avoid tunneling of
the outcome after a success.37
Depending on which of these two effects dominates, social welfare can
increase in the degree of informational asymmetry. This is summarized in
Figure 3: when exploration is moderate, there is a region of the probabilities







. When the probability of two
consecutive successes under the novel approach is very high, this does
not happen, as exploration becomes very attractive, and incentives to
exploitation are provided by reducing the total amount of capital invested.
The increase in social welfare is not a Pareto improvement. Figure 4
shows that, as one would expect, losing information is costly for the
principal, and thus the increase in social welfare is just a consequence
of the increase in the agent’s surplus.
37As exploration becomes more and more moderate, the principal needs to provide less kH 〈C 〉CC
and more k1 〈C 〉CC , with the consequence that a successful firm might actually shrink. See Online
Appendix A.2 for a more formal analysis.
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Fig. 3. Welfare from exploitation: observable versus unobservable actions




, 0}. Darker shades are associated with higher
values, meaning that social welfare is higher under unobservability of both outcomes and actions. In the white area,
W 〈C 〉C
C
≤ W 〈C 〉C
C
. Dashed lines represent zero contours and the left dashed line also separates moderate
exploration (above) from radical exploration (below).
(a) (b) 
Fig. 4. Exploitation surplus: observable versus unobservable actions
Notes: (a) This panel shows negative contours for S 〈C 〉C
C
− S 〈C 〉C
C
, where darker shades are associated with
lower values. In the white area, S 〈C 〉C
C
= S 〈C 〉C
C
because the principal offers the same contract. (b) This panel




, 0}, where darker shades are associated with higher values. In the
white area, V 〈C 〉C
C
≤ V 〈C 〉C
C
. Dashed lines represent zero contours. In both panels, the dotted line separates
moderate exploration (above) from radical exploration (below).
VI. Implications: A Numerical Example
This section complements the above analysis with some implications of the
model for firm dynamics and social welfare. We mostly rely on numerical
results, but some of these implications are established formally.
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Firm Dynamics
We start by highlighting some of the implications of our model for firm
size and growth. As said before, we refer to the level of working capital
invested as a measure of the scale of the firm. We compare the scale of
the firm in the first period and in the second period after a success under
different contracts and types of exploration.38
Corollary 1. Under a hands-on principal, a conventional firm grows faster
than an innovative firm. Conversely, an innovative firm grows faster than a
conventional firm under a hands-off principal. Riskier innovative firms under
hands-off principals grow the fastest.
Figure 5 shows that, under a hands-on principal, the dynamics of the
two types of firm, conventional and innovative, are substantially similar to
one another. Both moderate and radical innovative projects start small, and
are substantially scaled up only after a success is reported. Similarly, the
optimal exploitation contract (which does not depend on the probabilities
of success of the novel approach) involves a relaxation of the financing
constraints following a success. Indeed, stricter credit constraints at the
beginning of the relationship, together with a reward for success and
a punishment for failure, minimize the agent’s incentives to embezzle
revenues. Interestingly, a conventional project under a hands-on principal
starts smaller and grows faster than an innovative venture.
Figure 6 shows that the implications for firm dynamics are substantially
different if both the outcomes and the action plan are the private information
of the agent. Under both radical and moderate exploration, an innovative
firm receives less capital in the first period than the corresponding
conventional firm: starving an innovative agent not only limits losses
and disincentivizes stealing, but also minimizes the agent’s incentive to
resort to the conventional project (thus incentivizing risk-taking). Moreover,
following a success, growth rates are substantially greater for small,
successful, and innovative firms than for conventional firms.
As far as we know, the theoretical prediction that the effect of innovation
investments on firm growth differs depending on the type of financing the
firm has access to has not been tested empirically. However, the empirical
literature has recognized that the impact of innovation on growth is indeed
different for different types of firms (e.g., Del Monte and Papagni, 2003;
Coad and Rao, 2008; Demirel and Mazzucato, 2012; Segarra and Teruel,
2014; Mazzucato and Parris, 2015).
38The unconditional probability of success of the novel approach used to generate the figures in
this subsection is E[πN ] = 0.3. For “moderate”, the conditional probability of success of the
novel approach following a success in the first period is E[πN |H, N ] = 0.7, while for “radical”
it is E[πN |H, N ] = 0.5.
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Fig. 5. Firm size and growth under a hands-on principal
Notes: The number above the second bar in each panel represents the scale in the second period after a success relative
to the scale in the first period.
Fig. 6. Firm size and growth under a hands-off principal
Notes: The number above the second bar in each panel represents the scale in the second period after a success relative
to the scale in the first period.
Contract Offered and Welfare Implications
Because we have given all the bargaining power to the principal, the
contract offered in equilibrium will be the one that, for given probabilities
of success, will maximize the principal’s surplus. Figure 7(b) shows that a
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(a) (b) 
Fig. 7. When is an exploration contract offered?
Notes: (a) This panel shows contours for max{S 〈N 〉N
C
− S 〈C 〉C
C
, 0}. (b) This panel shows contours for
max{S 〈N 〉N
C
− S 〈C 〉C
C
, 0}. In both panels, darker shades are associated with higher values. The dotted line
separates moderate exploration (above) from radical exploration (below). The 0.000 line indicates the zero contour.
In the white area, an exploitation contract is offered.
hands-off principal’s surplus from offering an exploration contract exceeds
the surplus from an exploitation contract only when the probability of
two consecutive successes under N is quite high. By comparing this
with Figure 7(a), we can see that the region of probabilities for which
an exploration contract is offered by the principal is smaller when
the informational asymmetry increases. The reverse is obviously true
with regards to the exploitation contract. This suggests that under arm’s
length financing it is relatively more difficult to finance innovations with
respect to the relationship-based financing case, as only those innovative
projects perceived as more likely to succeed (less risky) have access to
funds.39
However, when offering an exploration contract, a hands-off principal
might need to provide more capital to prevent the agent not only
from tunneling but also from resorting to the more predictable old
technology. Therefore, on the one hand, innovation is harder to finance when
financiers have less information, but on the other, the increased degree
of informational asymmetry means that entrepreneurs whose projects are
perceived as more productive not only are allowed to explore but also might
be less constrained in the amount they can borrow in the long run, and this
is socially efficient. This is summarized in Figure 8: the set on the right is
39In Online Appendix A.2, we also show that under relationship-based financing, the surplus
of the principal is a constant share (1 − α)/(2 − α) of total welfare. As a consequence, the
hands-on principal always offers the exploration contract when it is constrained efficient to do
so. Conversely, this is not true under arm’s length financing.
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Fig. 8. Increased information asymmetry can be valuable
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}. It represents probabilities for which the principal
always offers the exploitation contract and welfare is higher under a hands-off principal. The dotted line separates
moderate exploration (above) from radical exploration (below).
the intersection between the region of probabilities for which an exploration
contract delivers higher social welfare under a hands-off principal than
under a hands-on principal (Figure 1), with the region of probabilities
for which an exploration contract is always offered (Figure 7(b)).
Thus, it shows that there exists a region of probabilities for which an
exploration contract is offered in equilibrium, and for which social welfare
is higher when the informational asymmetry increases. We can also see that
an equivalent set exists when the principal wants the agent to exploit: for
the set on the left, the equilibrium exploitation contract is such that social
welfare is higher when the informational asymmetry is greater.
VII. Conclusions
When does an innovative project benefit from a lack of resources? In
this paper, we have offered a two-period principal–agent model, where
innovation is modeled as experimentation of untested actions, riskier than
a conventional approach. We have studied the relationship between an
entrepreneur and a potential financier under different degrees of information
asymmetry. We have considered and compared three cases: the full-
information case, in which the entrepreneur and the investor have access
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för utgivande av the SJE/The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
26 Can starving start-ups beat fat labs?
to the same information; the relationship-based financing case, in which
the entrepreneur is better informed than the principal on the outcome of
the production process; and the arm’s length financing case, in which the
entrepreneur privately chooses the novelty of the project and can embezzle
revenues for her own consumption. We focused on the trade-off between
increasing the scale of the project to reap higher profits and starving the
agent for incentive reasons.
In the full-information case, the entrepreneur is well resourced, and
experimentation occurs unless the agents are sufficiently pessimistic about
the probability of success of the novel approach. An innovative project
starts smaller than a conventional one, given that the initial probability
of success is lower. In the relationship-based financing case, the amount
of working capital that the principal is willing to provide is reduced, as
financing constraints arise endogenously to minimize the agent’s incentives
to divert the outcome realizations. In the arm’s length financing case,
fewer innovative projects are funded, and the principal further starves
an innovative agent, as this incentivizes risk-taking and minimizes the
agent’s incentive to resort to the safer conventional approach. Moreover,
under the optimal contract, the innovative firm is significantly scaled up
after a success in the first period, and an innovative entrepreneur can
retain its access to capital even after a failure. This has the counter-
intuitive consequence that decreasing the principal’s information (while
keeping the agent’s information constant) can potentially increase social
welfare: resource-starved innovative start-ups can be socially optimal when
researchers are better informed.
Our results show that innovation can be incentivized both in small
independent start-ups and in-house by mature firms, but the best way
to do so varies across different economic environments. The agent is
well resourced (perhaps resembling a large R&D department) when the
investor is equally (or better) informed about the outcome of the innovation
process; conversely, starvation contracts (perhaps resembling fast-growing
start-ups) are optimal when the researchers can focus on safer but non-
innovative alternatives and have a better idea than investors of whether a
new technology answers the customers’ needs. Consider, for example, the
hugely successful Google Maps, and the now scrapped Google Wave. Both
were conceived by Lars and Jens Rasmussen. Where 2, the start-up that
would become Google Maps, was based in the spare bedroom of one of
the co-founders (Copeland and Savoia, 2011) and had minimal resources.
According to an article published on CNN Labs,40 the Rasmussen brothers
40See the article by John D. Sutter published on CNN Labs in 2009, “The genius brothers
behind Google Wave” (available online at http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/10/27/rasmussen.
brothers.google.wave/).
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only had $16 between them when they sold their app to Google. After
joining Google, they insisted on creating a start-up-like team within Google
to develop Wave; moreover, differently from other in-house projects, they
were allowed almost limitless autonomy, secrecy, and plentiful resources
(Copeland and Savoia, 2011). Nevertheless, the project was scrapped after
a long runway. Our model suggests that one of the reasons for the success
of Maps and the failure of Wave is in the contrasting incentives. The frugal
Where 2 provided the optimal high-stakes situation for the development of
Maps (see the article cited in footnote 40). Conversely, the combination
of secrecy and abundant resources did not work well for Wave: perhaps
a large budget coupled with a hands-on management by Google, or the
same level of independence but with scarcer resources, could have worked
better.
In this paper, we have neglected many potential distortions in order to
maintain tractability, and future work could try to incorporate them (e.g., the
presence of limited commitment, and the possibility that principal and agent
could have different discount factors or degrees of risk aversion).41 More
interestingly, one could remove the assumption that the functional form for
the outcome in the case of success is the same between conventional and
novel projects: a perhaps more natural way of modeling the problem would
be to let the successful outcome increase with the riskiness of the project.
This is particularly relevant when studying the incentives for truly radical
innovations, but one can argue that, in such cases, innovation should be
perceived as ambiguous. Furthermore, in our model, the scale of the project
both influences the expected revenues of the firm, and shapes the incentives
to the agent, but it does not affect learning; more realistically, one could
assume that more is learned from larger experiments. Moreover, our two-
period model is not well suited to study the optimal number of experiments.
One could try to develop a fully dynamic problem, where the firm operates
for multiple periods, capital is long-lived and potentially irreversible, and
the innovative projects evolve through different phases, with research at
each step depending on the outcomes of previous phases. Additionally,
by including adverse selection, one could provide the entrepreneur with
the possibility to signal her ability, perhaps allowing firms’ past patenting
41Moreover, we have taken as given the distinction between hands-on and hands-off principals.
Future works could, conversely, allow the principal to observe the project selection stage for a
cost. Venture capitalists, for example, are often able to gather more information about the firm’s
prospect than traditional investors, but this requires time, effort, and expertise (Gompers and
Lerner, 2004; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). Perhaps, another important element that is missing
in the model is the crucial advisory role that venture capitalists provide to start-ups (Gompers
and Lerner, 2004), but this comes with additional agency problems that one should consider (see
Casamatta, 2003).
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activities to alleviate the presence of financing constraints. Finally, following
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), there has been an increasing interest in
incorporating the optimal contract framework into a general equilibrium
model. We leave these interesting extensions to future research.
Supporting Information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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för utgivande av the SJE/The editors of The Scandinavian Journal of Economics.
A. Spiganti 29
Del Monte, A. and Papagni, E. (2003), R&D and the Growth of Firms: Empirical Analysis of a
Panel of Italian Firms, Research Policy 32, 1003–1014.
DeMarzo, P. M. and Fishman, M. J. (2007), Agency and Optimal Investment Dynamics, Review
of Financial Studies 20, 151–188.
DeMarzo, P. M. and Sannikov, Y. (2017), Learning, Termination, and Payout Policy in Dynamic
Incentive Contracts, Review of Economic Studies 84, 182–236.
Demirel, P. and Mazzucato, M. (2012), Innovation and Firm Growth: Is R&D Worth It?, Industry
and Innovation 19, 45–62.
Drugov, M. and Macchiavello, R. (2014), Financing Experimentation, American Economic
Journal: Microeconomics 6, 315–349.
Dryden, N., Nickell, S., and Nicolitsas, D. (1997), What Makes Firms Perform Well?, European
Economic Review 41, 783–796.
Ederer, F. (2016), Incentives for Parallel Innovation, Working paper (available online at http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2309664).
Ederer, F. and Manso, G. (2013), Is Pay for Performance Detrimental to Innovation?, Management
Science 59, 1496–1513.
Gerardi, D. and Maestri, L. (2012), A Principal–Agent Model of Sequential Testing, Theoretical
Economics 7, 425–463.
Gomes, R., Gottlieb, D., and Maestri, L. (2016), Experimentation and Project Selection:
Screening and Learning, Games and Economic Behavior 96, 145–169.
Gompers, P. and Lerner, J. (2004), The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Halac, M., Kartik, N., and Liu, Q. (2016), Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, Review of
Economic Studies 83, 1040–1091.
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